

## Message Text

PAGE 01 SEOUL 02856 231133Z

44

ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 INR-05

CIAE-00 SP-02 L-01 SAM-01 IO-03 /041 W

----- 004871

P 230910Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9648

INFO DOD

JCS

CINCPAC

S E C R E T SEOUL 2856

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT CINCUNC/EMBASSY MESSAGE

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR KS KN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF PRESIDENT PARK ON NORTHWEST ISLANDS,DEFENSE  
OF SEOUL AND I CORPS (US/ROK) GROUP

1. ON APRIL 22, PRESIDENT PARK SPENT NEARLY FOUR HOURS  
AT HEADQUARTERS I CORPS (ROK/US). HE WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY  
THE MND, CJCS, AND ROK ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. PURPOSE  
OF VISIT WAS TO BE UPDATED ON OPERATIONAL READINESS OF  
FORCES DEFENDING WESTERN CORRIDOR. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH  
GAVE EXCELLENT BRIEFING; SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION RANGED TO  
BROADER ISSUES AND CONTINUED THROUGH LUNCH HOUR.

2. HOLLINGSWORTH PRESENTED, IN SOME DETAIL, PLANS  
FOR IMPLEMENTING FORWARD DEFENSE CONCEPT WHICH  
CINCUNC HAD OUTLINED AT SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING  
LAST SEPTEMBER. AS IS KNOWN, OVERRIDING AIM  
OF THAT CONCEPT IS TO BLUNT AND STOP ANY ATTACK BEFORE  
IT HAS PROGRESSED TO POINT OF ENDANGERING SEOUL.

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 02856 231133Z

PRESIDENT WAS THOROUGHLY IMPRESSED BY BOTH CONCEPT AND  
PLANS/PREPAREATIONS TO IMPLEMENT IT. HE TOOK SPECIFIC  
NOTE OF A NUMBER OF LOGISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL  
SHORTCOMINGS WHICH MERITED ATTENTION AND ENGAGED HIS

GOVERNMENT TO DO ALL FEASIBLE TO CORRECT THEM WITH DISPATCH. THEREAFTER, HE TOUCHED ON THREE SUBJECTS PERTINENT TO THE DEFENSE OF ROK.

3. NORTHWEST ISLANDS:

A. THE PRESIDENT STARTED BY STATING THAT HOLLINGSWORTH'S BRIEFING MADE HIM CONFIDENT ABOUT MILITARY POSTURE IN WESTERN TERRITORY AND CAPABILITY TO DEFEND SEOUL. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH NORTH KOREAN SURPRISE ATTACK ON ONE OR MORE OF NORTHWEST ISLANDS. ADDRESSING CINCUNC, HE POSED SPECIFIC QUESTION: WHAT WOULD YOUR REACTION BE?

B. CINCUNC REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY IDENTIFIED AT LEAST TWENTY DIFFERENT NORTH KOREAN OPTIONS FOR THREATENING ISLANDS OR ACCESS THERETO. THESE RAN GAMUT FROM MINOR HARRASSMENT TO AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE ATTACK; EACH SUGGESTED A DIFFERENT RESPONSE. CINCUNC GAVE PERSONAL ESTIMATE THAT ANY NORTH KOREAN INITIATIVES WOULD LIKELY START AT THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE - AS, FOR EXAMPLE, REPEAT OF 24 MARCH PENETRATIONS INTO AIR SPACE WEST OF INCHON. IN THIS CONNECTION, CINCUNC NOTED THAT AS SOON AS ROK F-4'S WERE ALOFT AND SAM RADARS LOCKED ON, THE NORTH KOREA AIRCRAFT WENT HOME.

C. PRESIDENT SAID HE WELL UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE OF NON-ESCLATORY RESPONSE. TYPE OF SITUATION THAT CINCUNC POSTULATED WAS ONE THING. HOWEVER, AN ACTUAL ATTACK AGAINST ONE OR MORE OF THE ISLANDS WAS QUITE ANOTHER, GIVEN THEIR REMOTENESS AND CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES OF RESUPPLY AND REENFORCEMENT.

D. CINCUNC STATED THAT, THANKS TO PRUDENT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY ROK ARMED FORCES TO STRENGTHEN GARRISONS AND WEAPONRY, FORCES ON ISLANDS HAD A GOOD DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, FOR THE SHORT TERM. THUS, THERE  
SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 02856 231133Z

WOULD BE TIME FOR ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING AT GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

E. PRESIDENT SAID THAT BOTH THE CIVILIAN POPULACE OF ISLANDS, AND THEIR GARRISONS HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED AND MOTIVATED FOR DETERMINED DEFENSE. SHELTERS HAVE BEEN DUG FOR EVERYONE AND POPULACE IS PREPARED TO GO UNDERGROUND AND ACCEPT FRIENDLY AIR STRIKES DIRECTLY ON THE ISLAND, IF THIS IS NECESSARY TO REPEL ENEMY. PEOPLE OF ISLANDS ARE ROK CITIZENS AND THE ISLANDS ARE ROK TERRITORY. IF ENEMY TAKES ANY INCY OF OUR TERRITORY, WE WILL NOT CONFORM TO THE COMMUNIST SCENARIO OF NEGOTIATING

THE MATTER AT PANMUNJOM. WE WILL RE-TAKE WHAT WE LOST AND RESTORE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. CINCUNC PLANNING MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

F. CINCUNC SAID, IN PRINCIPLE, EVERY PYONG OF THE ROK TERRITORY WAS EQUALLY SACRED. HOWEVER, IF NORTH KOREA WERE DETERMINED TO MASS AIR, NAVAL AND GROUND ELEMENTS TO PRESS A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST THE NORTHERN THREE ISLANDS, FORCE RATIOS WOULD BE DISTINCTLY ADVERSE. CONFRONTED WITH SUCH AN EQUATION, THE DECISION AMONG SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTIONS COULD NOT BE LEFT SOLELY TO THE FIELD COMMANDER. NATURE AND LOCALE OF RESPONSE WAS PROPERLY A MATTER FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION MAKING AT GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

4. DEFENSE OF SEOUL:

A. PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS DEEPLY PREOCCUPIED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND POTENTIAL IMPACT THEREOF ON KOREAN PENINSULA. WHILE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT EXACT ATTITUDE OF NORTH KOREAN REGIME, COMMUNIST SUCCESSES IN INDO-CHINA AND KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO PEKING SUGGEST THAT THERE IS A HIGH POSSIBILITY THAT NORTH KOREA WILL UNDERTAKE ANOTHER ARMED PROVOCATION. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT PRESIDENT RALLY HIS PEOPLE. PRESERVATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS VITAL TO A NATION'S SPIRIT AND TRANSLATES INTO DETERMINATION NOT TO YIELD A SINGLE INCH OF LAND.

SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 02856 231133Z

B. PRESIDENT CONTINUED THAT CURRENT DEFENSE PLANS FOR SEOUL PROVIDE FOR MAJOR EVACUATION OF POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO AREAS SOUTH OF THE HAN RIVER. HOWEVER, HE WAS DIRECTING A CHANGE IN THAT POLICY. "THE GOVERNMENT AND 6.5 MILLION PEOPLE WILL REMAIN IN SEOUL AND FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN". AS WE HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM VIETNAM, MASSIVE EVACUATION OF CIVIL POPULACE MEANS DISASTER; WE DON'T WANT A REPETITION OF DA NANG. IF WE WITHDRAW FROM SEOUL, THERE WILL STILL BE GREAT CONFUSION AND LOWERED MORALE OF SOLDIETS AT THE FRONT. CONVERSELY, KNOWING THAT THE PEOPLE ARE REMAINING IN SEOUL, NO SOLDIER WILL TAKE A BACKWARD STEP AND THE CIVIL POPULACE WILL TAKE HEART FROM THE ASSURANCE THAT FRONT LINE IS STABLE.

C. PRESIDENT SAID HE INTENDS TO MAKE THIS DECISION PUBLIC IN VERY NEAR FUTURE. CONCOMITANTLY, HE WILL EXHORT CITIZENS OF SEOUL TO PREPARE SHELTERS/BUNKERS THROUGHOUT CITY FOR PROTECTION AGAINST AIR OR GUERRILLA ATTACK. HE AGREED WITH STILWELL/HOLLINGSWORTH CONCEPT THAT FIRST BATTLE WOULD BE DECISIVE; AND THE

KEY IN THE EARLY DAYS WAS MAINTENANCE OF CONTINUITY  
OF GOVERNMENT AT ALL ECHELONS. ONLY WHEN SITUATION  
WAS CLARIFIED AND STABILIZED COULD ONE THINK OF ORDERLY  
AND SELECTIVE EVACUATION OF NON-COMBATANT PERSONNEL.

TENURE OF I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP

A. THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF PLANS  
FOR DEACTIVATION OF THE I CORPS GROUP LATER THIS  
YEAR. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED THAT TO BE A VERY UNWISE MOVE.

B. CINCUNC SAID THAT, AS HE HAD REPORTED TO MND,  
THE TIMING OF THE DEACTIVATION OF THE I CORPS GROUP  
WAS BEING RECONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT VIEWS  
OF PRESIDENT PARK WERE PERTINENT TO THIS RECONSIDERATION.

C. THE PRESIDENT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT  
HIS VIEWS BE REPORTED. IT WAS HIS FIRM OPINION

SECRET

PAGE 05 SEOUL 02856 231133Z

THAT, GIVEN THE EXTREMELY VOLATILE SITUATION IN  
ASIA, DEACTIVATION OF THE I CORPS GROUP WOULD BE  
A SIGNAL FOR ENCOURAGING KIM IL SUNG. CONSEQUENTLY,  
PRESIDENT FELT THAT TENURE OF I CORPS GROUP SHOULD BE  
EXTENDED UNTIL AT LEAST NEXT YEAR.

SNEIDER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY PLANS, ISLAND CLAIMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** johnsorg  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SEOUL02856  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 XGDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750142-0238  
**From:** SEOUL  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197504104/baaaaugx.tel  
**Line Count:** 193  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** johnsorg  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 15 JUL 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <15 JUL 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <14 NOV 2003 by johnsorg>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, KS, KN, US, I CORPS, NORTHWEST ISLANDS, (PARK)  
**To:** STATE INFO DOD  
JCS  
CINCPAC  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006